air quality and flaring
information and resources
California and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) have some of the nation’s most stringent regulations to control emissions and protect public health.
flaring
Chevron Richmond maintains a comprehensive network of safety systems that are designed to keep our plants running safely and reliably during all operating conditions. One of the most visible components of those safety systems is our network of flares.
These essential safety devices are used to relieve pressure during the refining process. Chevron Richmond has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to deploy new technologies that have allowed us to recover gases that would otherwise be flared and recycle them back through our processing plant.
Sometimes it is not possible to fully recover all the excess gas in a safe manner. In these instances, our flare gas recovery system is designed to route any excess gas through the flare stack. Most of the excess gas is fully combusted before it is released. The flare stacks are very tall to minimize the potential impact to surrounding neighborhoods.
Chevron Richmond is committed to identifying and addressing areas that can improve flaring performance. There was an increase in flaring events as we brought our new, more energy-efficient, hydrogen plant online in 2019. In response, we made changes to our operating practices and invested in new equipment and technology, which have resulted in an improvement in flaring performance.
fast facts
When a flare event happens, we provide timely information to regulatory agencies who inform the public of any potential action required.
Chevron Richmond is committed to keeping the community informed and updated when flaring occurs. Here are ways you can contact us and access information:
community air monitoring resources:
- www.richmondairmonitoring.org (funded by Chevron but operated independently)
- www.baaqmd.gov (search air quality)
- www.transparentrichmond.org
- www.purpleair.org
- www.ramboll-shair.com
- www.breezometer.com
- www.airnow.gov
flaring reports
BAAQMD-reportable flaring events are listed below. Chevron Richmond fully investigates the cause of flaring events and implements necessary corrective actions.
2025
11/20/25
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.484
Methane (lbs): 13; NMHC (lbs): 1166; SO2 (lbs): 595.8
-
10/01/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 6 hours 57 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 20.3
Methane (lbs): 10,054; NMHC (lbs): 2,452; SO2 (lbs): 56.0310/02/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 6 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 5.96
Methane (lbs): 2,953; NMHC (lbs): 719; SO2 (lbs): 16.5 10/28/25
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 15 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.111
Methane (lbs): 10.6; NMHC (lbs): 45; SO2 (lbs): 310.9Flare Name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare Duration: 8 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.002
Methane (lbs): 0.2; NMHC (lbs): 1.9; SO2 (lbs): 2.7Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 9 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.266
Methane (lbs): 9.7; NMHC (lbs): 31.2; SO2 (lbs): 1115.1Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 15 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.165
Methane (lbs): 8.9; NMHC (lbs): 27; SO2 (lbs): 734.410/29/25
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 8 hour 7 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.096
Methane (lbs): 20.4; NMHC (lbs): 57.8; SO2 (lbs): 194Flare Name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare Duration: 1 minute
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.0008
Methane (lbs): 0.1; NMHC (lbs): 0.6; SO2 (lbs): 1Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 5 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.179
Methane (lbs): 11.9; NMHC (lbs): 25.3; SO2 (lbs): 928.7Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 1 minute
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.0393
Methane (lbs): 2.3; NMHC (lbs): 7.9; SO2 (lbs): 220.2
-
9/06/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 11 hours 32 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 2.83
Methane (lbs): 376.7; NMHC (lbs): 42.6; SO2 (lbs): 4.069/07/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 16 hours 2 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.65
Methane (lbs): 316.8; NMHC (lbs): 47.7; SO2 (lbs): 1.23
Primary Cause: A planned shutdown of the Hydrogen Plant was conducted to complete planned maintenance. Hydrogen Plant shutdown procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the shutdown activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce any associated emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Flaring was not due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD. Flaring was consistent with Chevron’s BAAD-approved Flare Minimization Plan. Section 2.1 Table 2-2 identifies sources that can be flared in non-emergency situations (e.g. start-up, shutdown).
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant shutdown due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with shutdown procedures.
-
8/20/25
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 28 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.066
Methane (lbs): 7.3; NMHC (lbs): 17.4; SO2 (lbs): 836Flare Name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 28 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.0055
Methane (lbs): 0.9; NMHC (lbs): 3; SO2 (lbs): 28.5Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 40 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.14
Methane (lbs): 17.2; NMHC (lbs): 232.7; SO2 (lbs): 146.8Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 32 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.27
Methane (lbs): 5.3; NMHC (lbs): 13.9; SO2 (lbs): 418/21/25
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 5 hours 27 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.196
Methane (lbs): 28.3; NMHC (lbs): 96.2; SO2 (lbs): 3091.4Flare Name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 21 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.020
Methane (lbs): 3.4; NMHC (lbs): 9.3; SO2 (lbs): 97Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 5 hours 48 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.39
Methane (lbs): 45.8; NMHC (lbs): 564.9; SO2 (lbs): 548.1Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 5 hours 29 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.730
Methane (lbs): 15.3; NMHC (lbs): 63.4; SO2 (lbs): 89.3
Primary Cause: Replacement of the North Isomax (NISO) flare tip. To replace the flare tip, the NISO flare had to be fully out of service. It was determined that the flare system had two check valves in the relief system that would make this infeasible. Therefore, these check valves needed to be replaced with straight piping spools, which required the shutdown of two of the three North Yard FGR Compressors.
Note: the flare tip replacement was not conducted at the time of this flaring event. That repair was done later after a shutdown of the unit and no additional flaring occurred.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Flaring was not due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD. Flaring was consistent with Chevron’s BAAD-approved Flare Minimization Plan. Section 2.1 Table 2-2 identifies sources that can be flared in non-emergency situations (e.g. start-up, shutdown).
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during shutdown of flare gas compressors for planned maintenance due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with shutdown procedures.
- 07/29/2025
Flare Name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare Duration: 4 hours 15 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.35
Methane (lbs): 171.9; NMHC (lbs): 1,398.8; SO2 (lbs): 54,304.2Flare Name: FCC (S-6016)
Flare Duration: 17 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.004
Methane (lbs): 0.3; NMHC (lbs): 7.0; SO2 (lbs): 4.5
Primary Cause: Check values associated with the auto eductor failed, rendering the auto eductor unable to remove liquid from the compressor knockout drum.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was caused by a sudden and infrequent equipment failure beyond the reasonable control of the Refinery. The failure of the check valves associated with the auto-eductor and the plugging of the manual eductor piping led to an unexpected high liquid level in the compressor knockout drum, resulting in flaring within a process unit that necessitates immediate corrective action to restore normal and safe operations.
Preventative measure(s):- Evaluate and recommend potential changes to check valve design. Check valve design should consider frequent cycling. Estimated Completion Date: 09/30/2025
- Evaluate/update operator routine duty to ensure manual eductor functionality. Consider cycling/exercising manual eductor as well as steaming the through line into vessel to ensure line is free from plugging. Estimated Completion Date: 10/31/2025
- 06/06/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.93
Methane (lbs): 189; NMHC (lbs): 347; SO2 (lbs): 6.44Primary Cause: Malfunction of a pressure indicator that could not be foreseen.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD. The pressure instrument failed requiring immediate action to restore to normal and safe operation. The pressure indicator malfunction was a sudden, infrequent and not reasonably preventable equipment failure.
Preventative measure(s): The event was an unforeseen malfunction of the pressure indicator. The work to replace the indicator was done immediately, the unit was stabilized, and Chevron restarted the unit as soon as possible. Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with shutdown procedures.
- 05/05/25
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 10 hours 26 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.92
Methane (lbs): 76.3; NMHC (lbs): 5,869.76; SO2 (lbs): 6,938.28Primary Cause: The level instrumentation failed due to plugging.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s):- Repair the level instrumentations and develop critical checks and testing prior to startup to validate correct functionality for the critical instruments. Estimated Completion Date: 07/30/2025
- Install a cross-tie from a reciprocating pump to the outlet of the FGR knockout drum. Estimated Completion Date: 12/30/2025
- Repair or replace blowdown line from the FGR discharge knockout drum to the relief knockout drum. Estimated Completion Date: 08/30/2025
- 5/22/2025
Flare name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare duration: 8 hours 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.427
Methane (lbs) 47.6; NMHC (lbs) 415.3; SO2 (lbs) 21,527.06Primary Cause: The water wash system was out of service causing heat exchanger plugging.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s):- Add a pressure alarm on the heat exchanger discharge. Estimated Completion Date: 10/01/2025
- Perform engineering evaluation of installation of dp transmitter for the heat exchanger. If a new instrument is required, create a scope input for 2028 RLOP turnaround. Estimated Completion Date: 12/01/2025
- 5/31/2025
Flare name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare duration: 3 hours 49 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.59
Methane (lbs): 72.93; NMHC (lbs) 1,052.67; SO2 (lbs) 1,418.71Primary Cause: Lighter density oil (Medium Cycle Oil or MCO) migrated through suction valves that were not fully closed due to a malfunctioning engagement between the valve gate and the valve seat.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s):- Perform an engineering evaluation and provide a recommendation on a different design or configuration of the manual block valve that can be used in this application to allow for improved isolation. Estimated Completion Date: 11/19/2025
- Evaluate the feasibility of installing a local position indicator to the manual valves to determine the current position. Estimated Completion Date: 11/19/2025
- Update the pump warm-up checklist to include clear expectations when using Medium Cycle Oil to clear hydrocarbon blockages. Estimated Completion Date: 09/24/2025
- 03/02/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 10 hours 12 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 22.5
Methane (lbs): 3482.0; NMHC (lbs): 164.0; SO2 (lbs): 30.6Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
- 02/01/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 16 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.074
Methane (lbs): 36.5; NMHC (lbs): 828.7; SO2 (lbs): 600.0
Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 31 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.06
Methane (lbs): 11.3; NMHC (lbs): 77.5; SO2 (lbs): 630.6Primary Cause: Mechanical failure of a control valve positioner.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate and consider installing valve diagnostic software that gives an early indication of positioner failure and position feedback on critical control valves within the impacted process unit. Estimated Completion Date: 12/1/2025 - 02/02/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 7 hour 34 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.60
Methane (lbs): 49.0; NMHC (lbs): 198.8; SO2 (lbs): 324.4
Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 7 hour 34 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.46
Methane (lbs): 31.71; NMHC (lbs): 88.42; SO2 (lbs): 1015.17
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 2 hour 22 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.63
Methane (lbs): 55.86; NMHC (lbs): 262.34; SO2 (lbs): 4492.93
Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025
02/02/2025Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 5 hour 7 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.52
Methane (lbs): 218.4; NMHC (lbs): 33.7; SO2 (lbs): 1.0Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025
02/03/2025Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 11 hours 32 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 11.1
Methane (lbs): 1950.3; NMHC (lbs): 48.3; SO2 (lbs): 23.5Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025 - 02/07/2025
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 18 hours 11 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 26.3
Methane (lbs): 5137.54; NMHC (lbs): 132.76; SO2 (lbs): 60.36Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures. - 02/08/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 45 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.9
Methane (lbs): 192.1; NMHC (lbs): 416.0; SO2 (lbs): 4438.8Primary Cause: Hydrogen recycle compressors failed shut due to mechanical fatigue of the actuator linkage.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade linkage components for the impacted hydrogen recycle compressor to a more robust design with more mechanical advantage. Estimated completion date: 11/30/2025Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 4 hours 52 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 2.13
Methane (lbs): 63.8; NMHC (lbs): 294.84; SO2 (lbs): 13571.8Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 2 hours 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 2.2
Methane (lbs): 89.6; NMHC (lbs): 325.1; SO2 (lbs): 14317.1Primary Cause: Hydrogen recycle compressors failed shut due to mechanical fatigue of the actuator linkage.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate to consider re-designing governor system for unit recycle compressors to improve speed control performance. Estimated completion date: 3/31/2026 - 02/14/2025–2/15/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 23 hours 27 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 23.7
Methane (lbs): 7,675.6; NMHC (lbs): 171.7; SO2 (lbs): 76.0
Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
- 02/21/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 4 hours 5 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.9
Methane (lbs): 368.0; NMHC (lbs): 40.0; SO2 (lbs): 3.6Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
2024
- 08/02/2024 – Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 55 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.308
Methane (lbs): 110.1; NMHC (lbs): 157.0; SO2 (lbs): 64.8
Primary Cause: Mechanical failure of joint within the steam system.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate joint durability for this and similar steam turbine governor linkage systems. Make appropriate updates to standards, if necessary. Estimated Completion Date: 12/31/2025
August 2024 – Flare Causal Report - 08/15/2024 - Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 29 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.175
Methane (lbs): 20.15; NMHC (lbs): 117.56; SO2 (lbs): 523.18
Primary Cause: Ambiguous guidance in the startup procedure to manage high pressure alarm during startup.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Revise startup procedure to include guidelines for managing high pressure alarm on this equipment during startup. Estimated Completion Date: 03/31/2025
August 2024 – Flare Causal Report
