air quality and flaring
information and resources
California and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) have some of the nation’s most stringent regulations to control emissions and protect public health.
flaring
Chevron Richmond maintains a comprehensive network of safety systems that are designed to keep our plants running safely and reliably during all operating conditions. One of the most visible components of those safety systems is our network of flares.
These essential safety devices are used to relieve pressure during the refining process. Chevron Richmond has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to deploy new technologies that have allowed us to recover gases that would otherwise be flared and recycle them back through our processing plant.
Sometimes it is not possible to fully recover all the excess gas in a safe manner. In these instances, our flare gas recovery system is designed to route any excess gas through the flare stack. Most of the excess gas is fully combusted before it is released. The flare stacks are very tall to minimize the potential impact to surrounding neighborhoods.
Chevron Richmond is committed to identifying and addressing areas that can improve flaring performance. There was an increase in flaring events as we brought our new, more energy-efficient, hydrogen plant online in 2019. In response, we made changes to our operating practices and invested in new equipment and technology, which have resulted in an improvement in flaring performance.
fast facts
When a flare event happens, we provide timely information to regulatory agencies who inform the public of any potential action required.
Chevron Richmond is committed to keeping the community informed and updated when flaring occurs. Here are ways you can contact us and access information:
community air monitoring resources:
- www.richmondairmonitoring.org (funded by Chevron but operated independently)
- www.baaqmd.gov (search air quality)
- www.transparentrichmond.org
- www.purpleair.org
- www.ramboll-shair.com
- www.breezometer.com
- www.airnow.gov
flaring reports
BAAQMD-reportable flaring events are listed below. Chevron Richmond fully investigates the cause of flaring events and implements necessary corrective actions.
2025
- 05/05/25
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 10 hours 26 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.92
Methane (lbs): 76.3; NMHC (lbs): 5,869.76; SO2 (lbs): 6,938.28
- 5/22/2025
Flare name: RLOP (S-6039)
Flare duration: 8 hours 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.427
Methane (lbs) 47.6; NMHC (lbs) 415.3; SO2 (lbs) 21,527.06
- 03/02/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 10 hours 12 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 22.5
Methane (lbs): 3482.0; NMHC (lbs): 164.0; SO2 (lbs): 30.6Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
- 02/01/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 16 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.074
Methane (lbs): 36.5; NMHC (lbs): 828.7; SO2 (lbs): 600.0
Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 1 hour 31 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.06
Methane (lbs): 11.3; NMHC (lbs): 77.5; SO2 (lbs): 630.6Primary Cause: Mechanical failure of a control valve positioner.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate and consider installing valve diagnostic software that gives an early indication of positioner failure and position feedback on critical control valves within the impacted process unit. Estimated Completion Date: 12/1/2025 - 02/02/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 7 hour 34 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.60
Methane (lbs): 49.0; NMHC (lbs): 198.8; SO2 (lbs): 324.4
Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 7 hour 34 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.46
Methane (lbs): 31.71; NMHC (lbs): 88.42; SO2 (lbs): 1015.17
Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 2 hour 22 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.63
Methane (lbs): 55.86; NMHC (lbs): 262.34; SO2 (lbs): 4492.93
Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025
02/02/2025Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 5 hour 7 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.52
Methane (lbs): 218.4; NMHC (lbs): 33.7; SO2 (lbs): 1.0Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025
02/03/2025Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 11 hours 32 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 11.1
Methane (lbs): 1950.3; NMHC (lbs): 48.3; SO2 (lbs): 23.5Primary Cause: Failure of a condensate drum level indicator.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade level instruments for the critical condensate drums at the Hydrogen plant. Estimated Completion Date: 8/31/2025 - 02/07/2025
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 18 hours 11 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 26.3
Methane (lbs): 5137.54; NMHC (lbs): 132.76; SO2 (lbs): 60.36Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures. - 02/08/2025
Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 3 hours 45 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.9
Methane (lbs): 192.1; NMHC (lbs): 416.0; SO2 (lbs): 4438.8Primary Cause: Hydrogen recycle compressors failed shut due to mechanical fatigue of the actuator linkage.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Upgrade linkage components for the impacted hydrogen recycle compressor to a more robust design with more mechanical advantage. Estimated completion date: 11/30/2025Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 4 hours 52 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 2.13
Methane (lbs): 63.8; NMHC (lbs): 294.84; SO2 (lbs): 13571.8Flare Name: SISO (S-6012)
Flare Duration: 2 hours 44 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 2.2
Methane (lbs): 89.6; NMHC (lbs): 325.1; SO2 (lbs): 14317.1Primary Cause: Hydrogen recycle compressors failed shut due to mechanical fatigue of the actuator linkage.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? Yes. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the BAAD because it was triggered by an unforeseen and infrequent equipment failure beyond the Refinery’s reasonable control.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate to consider re-designing governor system for unit recycle compressors to improve speed control performance. Estimated completion date: 3/31/2026 - 02/14/2025–2/15/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 23 hours 27 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 23.7
Methane (lbs): 7,675.6; NMHC (lbs): 171.7; SO2 (lbs): 76.0
Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
- 02/21/25
Flare Name: Hydrogen (S-6021)
Flare Duration: 4 hours 5 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.9
Methane (lbs): 368.0; NMHC (lbs): 40.0; SO2 (lbs): 3.6Primary Cause: Hydrogen Plant startup procedures include routing flows to relief and subsequent flaring. Operations proceeded with the startup activities in a timely manner per the procedure to reduce the emissions.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Flaring cannot be prevented during Hydrogen Plant startup due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with startup procedures.
2024
- 08/02/2024 – Flare Name: NISO (S-6013)
Flare Duration: 55 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 1.308
Methane (lbs): 110.1; NMHC (lbs): 157.0; SO2 (lbs): 64.8
Primary Cause: Mechanical failure of joint within the steam system.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Evaluate joint durability for this and similar steam turbine governor linkage systems. Make appropriate updates to standards, if necessary. Estimated Completion Date: 12/31/2025
August 2024 – Flare Causal Report - 08/15/2024 - Flare Name: FCC (S-6016) and Alky (S-6019)
Flare Duration: 29 minutes
Vent Gas Volume (mmscf): 0.175
Methane (lbs): 20.15; NMHC (lbs): 117.56; SO2 (lbs): 523.18
Primary Cause: Ambiguous guidance in the startup procedure to manage high pressure alarm during startup.
Was the flaring the result of an emergency, as defined in Regulation 12-12-201? No.
Preventative measure(s): Revise startup procedure to include guidelines for managing high pressure alarm on this equipment during startup. Estimated Completion Date: 03/31/2025
August 2024 – Flare Causal Report
